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I. INTRODUCTION
"Termination of parental rights is the 'death penalty' of juvenile law."'
Terminating a parent's rights effectively severs completely and irrevocably
the rights of a parent in his or her natural child.2 The permanency and com-
pleteness of an action to terminate parental rights make it the most severe
* J.D. Candidate 2005, Nova Southeastern Shepard Broad Law Center; B.A. Florida
State University. The author wishes to acknowledge and thank her family and friends for their
endless love and support, Professor Michael Dale for his support and role as mentor and advi-
sor, all former and current professors that have contributed to her legal education, as well as
her fellow industrious colleagues of the NOVA LAW REVIEW for their untiring efforts.
I. Appellant's Initial Brief on the Merits at 3, N.S.H. v. Dep't of Children & Family
Servs., 843 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 2003) (No. SC02-261).
2. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
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legal intrusion into the sanctity of the family.3 It constitutes a direct interfer-
ence by the state into a parent's "essential" right to conceive and raise one's
child.4 Moreover, permanently severing the parent-child relationship has a
profound influence on the sociological and psychological well-being of the
child involved.5
Yet, despite the severe consequences of a termination of parental rights
suit, a termination of parental rights proceeding is not a criminal proceeding.6
For this reason, the absolute constitutional guarantee to court-appointed
counsel for indigent criminal defendants' is not afforded to indigent parents
in termination of parental rights proceedings.8 Nevertheless, many state
courts have broadened the right to counsel on state law grounds, construing
similar due process clauses requiring the appointment of counsel in their
state constitutions. 9
In Florida, parents have a statutory right to be represented by counsel in
a proceeding dedicated to the termination of parental rights.'" Given that this
right exists, it would naturally follow that a remedy must exist to right viola-
tions of this statutory entitlement." Yet, Florida courts have just recently
begun to address the specific question of whether the statutory right to ap-
pointed counsel in a termination of parental rights proceeding carries an im-
plicit requirement that counsel's assistance be competent and effective. Flor-
ida's First District Court of Appeal addressed this precise issue in L. W. v.
Department of Children & Families,2 in which it held parents entitled to
court-appointed counsel in dependency proceedings are also entitled to com-
3. See id. at 759.
4. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). This case was the first in which the
United States Supreme Court recognized the constitutional right to family relations. See id. at
390. In this case the Court struck down a Nebraska law that forbade the teaching of a foreign
language to children under the age of fourteen. See id. The Court held that the law violated a
parent's Fourteenth Amendment right to raise their children. Id.
5. See generally Matthew B. Johnson, Examining Risks to Children in the Context of
Parental Rights Termination Proceedings, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 397 (1996).
6. S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 825 So. 2d 1057, 1060 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
7. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963).
8. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31 (1981).
9. Rosalie R. Young, The Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination of Parental Rights
Proceedings: The States'Response to Lassiter, 14 TOuRO L. REV. 247,251 (1997).
10. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (2002).
1I. In re Isaac Oghenekevebe, 473 S.E.2d 393, 396 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (stating that if
section 7A-289.23 of the North Carolina General Statutes, guarantees a parent right to coun-
sel in termination of parental rights suit there should be a remedy to cure violations of the
statute).
12. 812 So. 2d 551 (Fla. I st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
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petent assistance of counsel. 3 The Fourth District Court of Appeal ad-
dressed the same issue in S.B. v Department of Children & Families,'4 in
which it rejected the courts holding in L. W.. 5 The issue of competent counsel
in dependency proceedings remained in an indeterminate state until July 10,
2003, when the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the decision in S.B..
This article will discuss the decisions in L. W. and S.B, as well as the fi-
nal ruling on the issue by the Supreme Court of Florida. Furthermore, this
article will conclude contrary to the Supreme Court of Florida's conclusion
in S.B., as it seeks to substantiate the right of indigent parents to effective
assistance of counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings in Florida.
In order to do that, this paper will begin by briefly discussing the interests at
stake in a termination hearing and the rights that are imperiled as a result of
those hearings. Next, there will be a brief discussion of the Florida Statutes
relating to termination of parental rights proceedings. Subsequently, this
article will address the evolution of the right to counsel in Florida. Follow-
ing, there will be a discussion of the holdings and implications of the appel-
late courts' decisions in L. W. and S.B. and the Supreme Court of Florida's
recent decision pertaining to the issue. Finally, this article will make a case
for competent counsel by addressing the United States Supreme Court's de-
cision in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 6 the implications and
shortcomings of that decision, and the Supreme Court of Florida's decision
in S.B..
II. THE INTERESTS AT STAKE IN TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
PROCEEDINGS
A parent's interest in his or her child is a basic right of man,'7 more pre-
cious than a property right,' 8 warranting deference and protection.' 9 Tradi-
tionally, the United States Supreme Court has treated issues pertaining to the
family with deep respect and integrity, holding the privacy of the family unit
sacred. 20 A family has an intrinsic human right to be free from unnecessary
13. Id. at 555.
14. 825 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
15. Id. at 1061.
16. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
17. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
18. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
19. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
20. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (constitutional guarantees of personal
privacy extend to family relationships); see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639
(1968) (parent's role in child bearing is "basic in the structure of our society"); Moore v. City
2003]
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state intrusion. 2' A parent's interest in the care and custody of his or her
child is superior to that of the state.22 Yet, a parent's right to raise his or her
child freely is not absolute, as it is subject to limitation by the state.23
Even though the institution of family is constitutionally protected, the
state has the power, under the "parens patriae" doctrine, 24 to interfere in the
parent-child relationship. 25 Parens patriae is founded on the idea that every
child's welfare is the concern of the state.26 Based on this doctrine, the state
cannot only infringe upon a parent's fundamental liberty interest, but can
destroy a family's structure by terminating a parent's rights completely and
irrevocably.2
7
There is often conflict between the constitutional protection of parental
decisions regarding families and the state's legitimate interest in protecting
their citizens, especially children. In light of this conflict, and because a
fundamental right is involved, state termination statutes should be construed
in a light most favorable to the parent.2 However, parental rights are "sub-
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (family is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition").
21. Moore, 431 U.S. at 498-500 (finding that unlike the property interests that are also
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, liberty interests in family privacy has its source in
intrinsic human rights as they have been understood in American tradition).
22. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding the right of Amish parents
to provide private education oriented to their religious beliefs in spite of a Wisconsin law that
required minors to attend high school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding
that a law that prohibits instruction of foreign language to children is unconstitutional).
23. See Note, The Right to Family Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach to
State Removal and Termination Proceedings, 68 GEO. L.J. 213, 216 (1979) [hereinafter Right
to Family Integrity].
24. "Parens Patriae" is Latin for "'parent of his or her country"' and refers traditionally
to:
1. The state regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protec-
tion to those unable to care for themselves.... 2. A doctrine by which a government
has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen, esp. on behalf of someone
who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit.... The state ordinarily has no
standing to sue on behalf of its citizens, unless a separate, sovereign interest will be
served by the suit. -- Also termed doctrine ofparens patriae.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999).
25. Id.
26. Right to Family Integrity, supra note 23.
27. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982).
28. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). Under the strict
scrutiny test, a state law impinging on a fundamental right must be justified by a compelling
state interest and must be drawn narrowly to limit state intrusion to situations where a compel-
ling state interest exists. Id; see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973) (woman's
right to have abortion limited only at point during pregnancy where state interest became
compelling); Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205 (finding the state interest in compulsory education insuf-
[Vol. 28:1:193
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ject to an overriding principle that it is the ultimate welfare or best interest of
the child that must prevail., 29 Thus, a termination of parental rights statute
should be interpreted so that it affords adequate protection to a parent's con-
stitutional rights while allowing severance of parental rights when the child's
interest in stability is paramount.3"
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS IN FLORIDA
Termination of parental rights is the modern statutory legal construct
that stems from the common law test that balanced a parent's rights and the
role of the state as parens patriae.31 In Florida, termination of parental rights
is governed by Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes.32 Terminating a parent's
right involves a two-step process.33 First, the court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that one of the grounds enumerated under section
39.806 of the Florida Statutes has been met,34 and the second step requires a
court determination that termination of parental rights would be in the best
interest of the child. 5
Termination of parental rights cases fall under two categories: those in
which the court has made a finding of dependency but the parents were pro-
vided an opportunity to regain custody through substantial compliance36 with
a case plan,37 and those situations in which there is no case plan or prospect
ficiently compelling to justify statute limiting the right to exercise religion and to raise chil-
dren in a chosen manner). A termination statute was struck down on the ground of vagueness
and substantive due process grounds in Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, 545 F.2d
1137 (8th Cir. 1976). Again strict scrutiny was applied to a termination statute one year later
in Roe v. Connecticut, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976). Again the statute was found to be
violative of due process because it did not promote a compelling state interest. See id.
29. In re J. L. P., 416 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
30. See Right to Family Integrity, supra note 23.
31. GILBERT PEREZ, FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 16.1, at 16-4(7th ed. 2001).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing § 39.802(4)(a)).
35. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.810, 39.802(4)(c) (2002); See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982).
36. PEREZ, supra note 31, at 16-5. A parent is in "substantial compliance" with a case
plan when "the circumstances which caused the creation of the case plan have been signifi-
cantly remedied to the extent that the well-being and safety of the child will not be endangered
upon the child's... being returned to the child's parent." § 39.01(68).
37. A case plan is an agreement between all parties involved in the dependency proceed-
ing that sets forth the actions to be taken by the parents, the Florida Department of Children
and Families and other professionals with the objective of rehabilitating the family unit. H.
Lila Hubert, In the Best Interests: The Role of the Guardian Ad Litem in Termination of Pa-
rental Rights Proceedings, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 531, 546 (1994).
2003]
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of family reunification. 38 A petition for termination of parental rights is filed
without a case plan for reunification if: a parent has voluntarily surrendered
the child for adoption, the parents have abandoned the child, 39 a parent's
conduct threatens the life, well-being, safety, or physical, mental, or emo-
tional health of the child, the parent is incarcerated;4° or the parent has en-
gaged in egregious conduct,4' or had the ability and knowledge to prevent the
egregious conduct done to the child.42 To effectuate a petition for termina-
tion of parental rights on this basis, Florida's Department of Children and
Families must show that there are no less restrictive means to protect the
child.43
However, most cases arrive at the termination of parental rights stage
following an adjudication of dependency, where "a case plan has been filed,
and the child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by the par-
ents. 44 A parent has twelve months from the date that the child was placed
into shelter to substantially comply with the case plan.45 If at the twelve-
month judicial review hearing the parents are found not to be within the req-
uisite compliance of the case plan, their parental rights are terminated.46
Because of this consequence, which involves the deprivation of certain
liberties, the United States Supreme Court has held that due process requires
38. PEREZ, supra note 31, at 16-5.
39. Section 39.01(1) of the Florida Statutes defines abandonment as "a situation in which
the parent . . .while being able, makes no provision for the child's support and makes no
effort to communicate with the child, which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection
of parental obligations." § 39.01(1). A finding of abandonment may be made upon a deter-
mination by the court that the parents have only made "marginal efforts that do not evince a
settled purpose to assume all parental duties." Id.
40. See § 39.806(1)(d); L.E. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 783 So. 2d 346 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
41. § 39.806(1)(D. Egregious conduct is defined as "abuse, abandonment, neglect, or any
other conduct of the parent: that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard of
conduct." § 39.806(l)(f)(2).
42. PEREZ, supra note 31, at 16-6-16-7. Other circumstances for termination of parental
rights without a case plan are: "the parent has subjected the child to aggravated child abuse,
sexual battery, or sexual abuse, or chronic abuse; [t]he parent has committed murder, volun-
tary manslaughter, or felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury to the child or another
child, or has aided abetted, attempted, or conspired or solicited to commit any of these acts;
[t]he parent has had parental rights to a sibling of the child involuntarily terminated." Id.
43. Inre D.W., 793 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
44. PEREZ, supra note 31, at 16-7.
45. Id. The court can extend the case plan on a finding that the child's situation is "ex-
traordinary" and that the child's best interest will be served in doing so. § 39.703(2). The
Department of Children and Families can also terminate parental rights before the expiration
of the twelve-month period, if they determine that the parent, while able to do so, has not
substantially complied with the case plan. § 39.703(l).
46. PEREZ, supra note 31, at 16-7.
[Vol. 28:1:193
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states to support their allegations by clear and convincing evidence.47 The
United States Supreme Court arrived at this intermediate burden of proof
after finding that the preponderance of evidence standard that is usually re-
quired in a civil proceeding, fell short of the demands required to meet due
process. 8 This is because a termination of parental rights proceeding does
not fit within the usual parameters of either a civil or a criminal case.49 For
this reason, a parental severance proceeding is "best characterized as 'quasi-
prosecutorial.""'5 The adversarial nature of a termination of parental rights
proceeding, and the due process rights involved, warrant an absolute right to
counsel in Floridaf'
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN FLORIDA
According to chapter thirty-nine of Florida law pertaining to termina-
tion of parental rights, parents have an absolute right to counsel in termina-
tion of parental rights proceedings.5 2  However, according to the United
States Constitution, parents do not have an absolute right to counsel in these
suits. 3 Though courts have long recognized a natural parent's due process
right of notice and an opportunity to be heard in a proceeding severing a par-
ents rights to custody of their child, the United States Supreme Court has
traditionally confined the constitutional right to counsel for indigent litigants
to defendants in criminal proceedings. 4 In the case of In re Gault, '5 the
47. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
48. Id.
49. Id. The reason why termination of parental rights proceedings do not fall comforta-
bly within the understood parameters of a civil or criminal proceeding is explained through:
The United States Supreme Court, in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982), [in which
they] stated that 'the fact- finding stage of a state-initiated permanent neglect proceeding bears
many of the indicia of a criminal trial' because of the following factors:
The Commissioner of Social Services charges the parents with permanent neglect. They are
served by summons. The factfinding hearing is conducted pursuant to formal rules of evi-
dence. The State, the parents, and the child are all represented by counsel ... the attorneys
submit documentary evidence, and call witnesses who are subject to cross-examination ....
[T]he judge then determines whether the State has proved the statutory elements [by the proper
burden ofprooj]. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Hubert, supra note 37, at 554 n.126.
50. Id. at 554.
51. N.S.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 843 So. 2d 898, 904 (Fla. 2003) (stating that
"the right to counsel [in dependency proceedings] may flow from, and have its origins in, the
Sixth Amendment in the criminal context ... [as well as] concepts of due process under the
United States and Florida Constitutions . .
52. § 39.013(1).
53. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
54. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
2003]
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United States Supreme Court looked as if it was "paving the way for an ex-
panded right to counsel based on the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of
'procedural due process through a fair hearing."' 56  However, the United
States Supreme Court decided contrary to what both state and federal courts
had anticipated,57 holding in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,5s that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not per se re-
quire that counsel be appointed for an indigent parent in a termination of
parental rights proceeding.59 Instead, the decision as to whether the Due
Process Clause requires appointed counsel for an indigent parent is left to the
trial court and subject to appellate review, in light of the private and govern-
ment interests at stake, "and the risk that the procedures used will lead to
erroneous decisions. 6°
Prior to the Lassiter court's holding, that indigent parents did not have
an absolute entitlement to court-appointed counsel, Florida case law recog-
nized the right to counsel for indigent parents in parental severance proceed-
ings. 6' In Florida, an indigent parent has an absolute right to be represented
by counsel, including the right to a state appointed attorney. 62 The Supreme
Court of Florida "has held 'that counsel is necessarily required under the due
process clause of the... Florida Constitution[], in [dependency] proceedings
involving the permanent termination of parental rights to a child, or when the
proceedings, because of their nature, may lead to criminal child abuse
charges."'63 Since October 1, 1998, the legislature has acknowledged that
the interests at stake in all dependency proceedings require representation by
counsel.' The court must advise a parent at every stage of a dependency or
55. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that a juvenile in a civil proceeding that had a possibility
of involuntary commitment was constitutionally entitled to state appointed counsel).
56. Young, supra note 9, at 249 (quoting Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Right of Indigent
Parent to Appointed Counsel in Proceeding for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights,
80 A.L.R. 3d 1141, 1144 (1977)).
57. Id. at 251.
58. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
59. See id. at 32.
60. Id. at 27.
61. See Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258, 260 (S.D. Fla. 1977); In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83
(Fla. 1980) (holding that the criminal due process requirement of court-appointed counsel at
the critical stages of arraignment, preliminary hearing, or custodial interrogation extends as
well to all stages of dependency procedure).
62. MICHAEL J. DALE, FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 10.2, § 10.3, at 10-4 (7th
ed. 2001) (citing FLA. STAT § 39.807(1)(a) (1998); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.515 (1998)) [hereinafter
Dale 1].
63. L.W. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 812 So. 2d 551, 554 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2002) (citing D.B., 385 So. 2d at 90).
64. § 39.013(1), (9)(a).
[Vol. 28:1:193
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 9
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol28/iss1/9
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
parental termination proceeding of his or her right to counsel, and upon a
determination of indigence, he or she is entitled to state appointed counsel.65
If a parent waives the right to counsel in one stage of the dependency
proceeding, the offer must be renewed at each subsequent stage of the case.66
When parents request an attorney and state that they do not understand
the proceedings, the trial court must appoint an attorney to represent the par-
ents.67 Parents are initially advised of their right to counsel at the shelter
hearing and are given reasonable time for which to obtain counsel.68 The
importance of counsel at a dependency hearing is evidenced by Florida law
stating that if parents or legal guardians appear at the shelter hearing without
counsel, the hearing may be continued for up to seventy-two hours, allowing
these parents to consult with their attorney.69 Furthermore, before parents are
permitted to waive their right to counsel, the court must determine that the
parent understands the right to counsel and the parent is knowingly waiving
that right, intelligently, and of their own volition. 70 The court makes the de-
termination based on "the age, education, and experience of the party [in-
volved], the nature or complexity of the case, and other factors.'
Though the right to assistance of counsel is imperative and cannot be re-
linquished without judicial acknowledgement, Florida, until July of 2003,
was irresolute as to whether parents are entitled to competent assistance of
counsel in dependency cases.72
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASES
A. L.W. v. Department of Children & Families
On March 28, 2002, Florida's First District Court of Appeal decided
L. W. v. Department of Children & Families.7 3 In this case, the Department
of Children and Families filed a dependency petition alleging that a father
had sexually abused his stepdaughter and that the mother neglected to protect
65. § 39.013 (9)(a).
66. J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 768 So. 2d 1060, 1068 (Fla. 2000).
67. McKenzie v. Dep't of Health Rehabilitative Servs., 663 So. 2d 682, 683 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
68. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(3) (2002).
69. § 39.402(3).
70. § 39.013(9)(c)(1).
71. Dale 1, supra note 62 § 10.3, at 10-4.
72. See L. W., 812 So. 2d at 552; S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 825 So. 2d 1057
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
73. 812 So. 2d at 551.
2003]
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her daughter from the abuse.74 The petition further alleged that the parents'
two sons were at risk of prospective abuse because of the father's behavior
with his stepdaughter.75 The parents denied the allegations and were ap-
pointed an attorney by the trial court.76 After a hearing on the matter, the
court determined that the allegations were proven by the greater weight of
evidence.77 Subsequently, the trial court held a disposition hearing at which
the same attorney represented the parents." The court decided to adhere to
the disposition and the children were removed from the parents' home.79
Thereafter, the mother obtained the services of a different attorney, while the
father continued to be represented by the same attorney.8 After a period of
over a year, the mother was still unable to have any contact with her daughter
and the father could have no contact with any of his children.8' In November
2000, both parents retained new counsel and filed writs of habeas corpus to
set aside the orders of adjudication and disposition based on ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.8 2 The trial court denied the petitions on the basis that, as a
matter of law, the remedies requested were not available.8 3
On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal acknowledged that this
was the first time a Florida court had addressed the issue of competent coun-
sel as it relates to a dependency proceedings.8 4 In this case, the First District
Court of Appeal held consistent with the position taken by an overwhelming
amount of jurisdictions, 5 that an indigent parent, who has a constitutional
right to court-appointed counsel in dependency proceedings, also has a right
to competent counsel. 86 The court also determined as a matter of first im-
pression, that the criminal standard announced in Strickland v. Washington, 7
applies to juvenile dependency proceedings.88 This standard would be util-
ized in determining whether court-appointed counsel was effective, as is nec-
essary to protect the parent's constitutional right to court-appointed counsel
74. Id. at 552.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. L.W., 812 So. 2d at 552.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 553.
82. Id.
83. L.W., 812 So. 2d at 554.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 556.
87. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
88. L.W., 812 So. 2d at 556.
[Vol. 28:1:193
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in dependency proceedings.89 The district court also determined that the ap-
propriate method for challenging the effectiveness of court-appointed coun-
sel is by a petition for writ of habeas corpus.90 Understanding that their de-
cision held extensive implications, the First District certified to the Supreme
Court of Florida the questions as to whether parents who are constitutionally
entitled to court-appointed counsel in dependency proceedings are also enti-
tled to competent assistance of counsel; and if so, is the proper procedure by
which to raise a claim of incompetent assistance of counsel a petition for
habeas corpus.9'
B. S.B. v. Department of Children & Families
In the meantime, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Florida was
presented with a similar issue in S.B. v. Department of Children & Fami-
lies.92 In S.B., a mother sought to set aside an order adjudicating her two
children dependent.93 In 1998, the court held an arraignment hearing on the
issue of dependency but the mother ("S.B."), who was personally served and
had notice of the hearing, failed to appear.9" At trial the children's fathers,
who had completed their case plan and been awarded custody, appeared and
gave their consent to the adjudication of dependency. 95 "The court pro-
ceeded as if S.B. had consented as well, pursuant to section 39.506(3) of the
Florida Statutes.' ,96 S.B. and her appointed counsel were present at the dis-
position hearing, at which time S.B.'s children were adjudicated dependent.9 7
Thereafter, S.B.'s attorney filed a motion to vacate and set aside the finding
of consent by default, declaring in the motion that she had sent the judge a
letter in lieu of attending to which the judge responded, indicating he could
not accept ex parte communications.98 There was no subsequent ruling on
S.B.'s motion and she did not appeal her children's adjudication of depend-
89. Id.
90. Id. at 557.
91. Id. at 558.
92. 825 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
93. Id. at 1058.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing that section 39.506(3) of the Florida Statutes states, "[fjailure of a person
served with notice to personally appear at the arraignment hearing constitutes the person's
consent to a dependency adjudication.").
97. S.B., 825 So. 2d at 1058.
98. Id.
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ency.99 S.B. then filed a motion to dismiss and remedy the decision of the
trial court based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 00
The Fourth District held that although S.B. had a right to appointed
counsel, her right was not a constitutional right but a statutory one, and that
she has no right to challenge her counsel's performance other than filing a
malpractice action.'0' The court stated that the Supreme Court of Florida has
indicated only two situations in which a parent's right to counsel is a consti-
tutional right. 0 2 The first circumstance in which a parent has a constitutional
right to counsel, under the Due Process Clause of the United States and Flor-
ida Constitutions, is in proceedings involving permanent termination of pa-
rental rights, and the second is when the proceeding, because of its nature,
may lead to criminal charges.'0 3 In its analysis, the court rejects the First
District's holding that a constitutional right to counsel necessarily implies a
right to competent counsel."°M In doing so, the court asserts a dependency
proceeding is not a criminal proceeding, and therefore, a criminal defen-
dant's right to counsel and an indigent parent's right to counsel in a termina-
tion proceeding are different.0 5 That is, competent counsel is not a protec-
tion afforded indigent parents under due process considerations. 
06
In addition, the Fourth District Court of Appeal declined to extend the
right to counsel, to include the assistance of competent counsel, because if
the same relief recognized in post conviction criminal cases were afforded
parents, it would serve to further disrupt the lives of the children years after a
dependency decision was made.0 7 In concluding, the court stated that it does
not recognize a right to competent counsel in a dependency proceeding
whether the right to counsel is constitutional or statutory and that S.B.'s peti-
tion is insufficient and will not be treated as a writ of habeas corpus.'0 8 Sub-
sequently, the decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida for
review. 9
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1058.
102. S.B., 825 So. 2d at 1059.
103. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 90 (Fla. 1980).
104. S.B., 825 So. 2d at 1060.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1061.
109. S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, No. SC02-2262, 2003 WL 21543565, at *l
(Fla. July 10, 2003).
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C. The Supreme Court of Florida Decides
On July 10, 2003 the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the Fourth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal's holding in S.B. v. Department of Children and Fami-
lies,"' which directly conflicts with the First District Court of Appeal's hold-
ing in L. W. "' That is that the right to court appointed counsel does not in-
clude a conclusive right to "collaterally challenge the effectiveness of coun-
sel."" 2 The Supreme Court of Florida contends that dependency proceedings
are civil in nature and it reiterates its decision. In the case of In re D.B.,' ,3
the court found that there is only a definitive constitutional right to counsel in
dependency proceedings under two circumstances: when the proceedings
may result in the permanent termination of parental rights, or when a parent
may be charged with criminal child abuse." 4  In all other circumstances the
right to counsel is not conclusive, rather the case-by-case approach estab-
lished in Potvin v. Keller... must be applied to determine if the right to coun-
sel in that particular dependency case is constitutional, and if not, it is merely
a statutory entitlement." 
6
Furthermore, the court distinguishes the litigants in L. W. from the liti-
gant in S.B., finding that in L. W. the parents faced criminal charges, thus they
had a constitutional right to counsel, unlike in S.B. where the defendant was
not criminally charged, thereby rendering her entitlement to counsel a statu-
tory right.'" In its holding, the Supreme Court of Florida made the inference
that only when there is a constitutional right to counsel... in a dependency
proceeding is there a right to pursue a collateral proceeding questioning the
competence of court-appointed counsel." 9 The Supreme Court of Florida
ultimately disapproved of the First District Court of Appeal holding in L. W.,
to the extent that it conflicts with its holding in S.B.." °
110. Id.
11. L.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 812 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
112. Id.; S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *1.
113. 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980).
114. S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *2 (citing In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 90 (Fla. 1980)).
115. 313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975) (citing Cleaver v. Wilcox, 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974)
which suggested, that the right to counsel in dependency proceedings would be dependent on
the potential length of the parent-child separation, the extent of restriction on parental visita-
tion, the presence or absence of parental consent, the presence or absence of disputed facts,
and the complexity of the proceeding).
116. S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *3.
117. Id. at *3-4.
118. See D.B., 385 So. 2d at 90; Potvin, 313 So. 2d at 703.
119. S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *5.
120. Id. at *5.
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VI. THE ERROR OF THEIR WAYS
In Florida, an indigent defendant in a dependency suit is entitled to
competent assistance of counsel only if he qualifies for a constitutional right
to counsel under either the Mathews v. Eldridge 21 or the Potvin v. Keller
balancing test. For this reason, the Supreme Court of Florida's handling of
S.B. is reminiscent of the United States Supreme Court's treatment of
Lassiter.22 These two decisions make a parent's right in his or her child
determinant on the loss of personal liberty or a judicial prophecy that a pro-
ceeding will not end in the severance of the parent-child relationship.1
23
These cases are both inconsistent and symbolic of a giant step back in the
effort to ensure indigent parents receive fair access to and just results in court
proceedings. 124
The scales of justice in Lassiter and S.B. appear to have been unbal-
anced before the first fact was spoken before a judge. In both of the cases
the courts began with a presumption that criminal defendants have more of a
right to physical liberty then a parent has to his or her "flesh and blood."'1
5
Moreover, the two cases require the indigent defendants to overcome a hap-
hazard cases-by-case analysis, which has been criticized as an improper
method by which to protect fundamental rights. 26 In Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services, the Court left the constitutional appointment of counsel in
termination proceedings to be determined by the state courts on a case-by-
case basis.2 7 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida in S.B. determined
that only parents who have a constitutional right to counsel have the right to
121. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see infra Section V.A.
122. Compare S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at * 1, with Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452
U.S. 18 (1981).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 18; S.B., v. Dep't of Children & Families, 825 So. 2d 1057
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002); S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *1.
126. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 35-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963)). A flexible case-by-case analysis was overruled in Gideon v. Wain-
wright. Id. Additionally, in 1998 the Florida Legislature passed section 39.013 of the Florida
Statutes, because of numerous appeals and inconsistent rulings resulting from the case-by-case
analysis. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1994 Survey of Florida Law, 19 NOVA L. REV. 139,
145 (1994) [hereinafter Dale 11].
127. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32.
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competent assistance of counsel and with two exceptions,128 a constitutional
right to counsel in Florida is determined on a case-by-case analysis. 29
A. The Problems with the Lassiter Case-By-Case Method of Review
In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, a North Carolina Court of
Appeal sought to terminate the parental rights of an indigent mother without
providing her counsel. 30 In 1975, a North Carolina district court found
Abby Gail Lassiter's son to be neglected and removed him from her home,
placing him in the state's custody. 3' One year later, Ms. Lassiter was con-
victed of second-degree murder and sentenced to serve twenty-five to forty
years in prison. 32 In 1978, the Department of Social Services initiated a
proceeding to terminate Ms. Lassiter's parental rights in her son.' 133
Ms. Lassiter appeared at the termination hearing but was not accompa-
nied by counsel nor was she offered counsel by the court. 3 4 Without the
assistance of counsel, Ms. Lassiter failed to object to hearsay testimony, ar-
gued with the state's witness instead of cross examining her, and did not
utilize avenues of defense available to her. 35 At the conclusion of the hear-
ing, the court ordered that Ms. Lassiter's parental rights be severed. 36
On appeal, Ms. Lassiter's counsel argued that the court's failure to ap-
point counsel at the termination hearing deprived her of the due process
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 3' The North Carolina
Court of Appeal denied the claim stating that the invasion of Ms. Lassiter's
individual privacy was not sufficient to warrant the appointment of coun-
sel. 38  Subsequently, the Supreme Court of North Carolina denied Ms.
128. The two exceptions are when the proceedings may result in permanent termination of
parental rights, or when a parent may be charged with criminal child abuse. In re D.B., 385
So. 2d 83, 90 (Fla. 1980).
129. S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *5 n.1. The case-by-case analysis that garners a parent a
constitutional right to counsel in Florida is governed by the test adopted in Potvin v. Keller,
313 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1975), in which the court stated, "[T]he right to counsel in dependency
proceedings would depend on the potential length of parent-child separation, the degree of
parental restrictions on visitation, the presence or absence of parental consent, the presence or
absence of disputed facts, and the complexity of the proceedings." Id.
130. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 22.
131. ld. at 20.
132. ld. at 40.
133. Jd. at 20-21.
134. ld. at 22.
135. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 53-56.
136. Id. at 24.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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Lassiter's petition for review, and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 1
39
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of North Caro-
lina Court of Appeal. 40 In this case the Court did not decide the scope of the
due process right to counsel, but rather left the decision for a case-by-case
determination.' 4' Justice Stewart, writing for the majority pursued a two-step
analysis of the issue. First, he concluded that the precedents of both criminal
and civil due process decisions have established a "presumption that an indi-
gent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may
be deprived of his physical liberty."' 142 The Court balanced this presumption
against the factors established in Mathews v. Eldridge, '41 the private interest,
the state interest, and the risk of error in existing procedures) 44 In weighing
those factors against the presumption the majority rejected a per se rule, in
favor of a case-by-case analysis stating:
If, in a given case, the parent's interests were at their strongest, the
State's interests were at their weakest, and the risk of errors were
at their peak, it could not be said that the Eldridge factors did not
overcome the presumption against the right to appointed coun-
sel .... But since the Eldridge factors will not always be so dis-
tributed, and since 'due process is not so rigid as to require that the
significant interests in informality, flexibility and economy must
always be sacrificed,' (citation omitted), neither can we say that
the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel in every ter-
mination of parental rights proceeding. 45
The case-by-case method of review suffers from several defects. A ju-
dicious analysis of this issue is found in Justice Blackmun's dissent in Las-
siter. In his dissent Justice Blackmun austerely criticizes the majority for
resorting to an "ad hoc," "thoroughly discredited," case-by-case analysis.'46
He also points out that the majority uses the same analysis as he does in
weighing the three factors listed in Mathews v. Eldridge, with both finding
139. Id.
140. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 34.
141. Id. at 31-32.
142. Id. at 26-27.
143. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
144. Id. at 321.
145. Lassiter, 452 U.S at 31-32 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)).
146. Id. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the "ad hoc" case-
by-case approach was "thoroughly discredited nearly 20 years [prior] in Gideon v. Wain-
wright." Id.
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"the private interest weighty, the procedure devised by the state fraught with
risk of error, and the countervailing governmental interest insubstantial."' 47
Yet, he states the Court refuses to
follow this balancing process test to its logical conclusion ... and
announces that a defendant parent must await a case-by-case de-
termination of his or her need for counsel. Because the three fac-
tors 'will not always be so distributed,' ... the Constitution should
not be read to 'requir[e] the appointment of counsel in every paren-
tal termination proceeding.
Justice Blackmun further points out that Mathews itself rejected such an
approach, stating that in the case the Court reasoned that "'procedural due
process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding pro-
cess as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions.""' 49 He
further argues that a case-by-case analysis is inconsistent, cumbersome, in-
trusive, and ultimately inadequate to protect parents' rights. 50
In addition, the rationale for a case-by-case analysis is less than influen-
tial and rests on dubious precedent. 5 ' Justice Blackmun points out in his
dissent, that the majority ignored precedent by neglecting to note that prior
due process analysis had focused on "different decision making contexts, not
different litigants within a given context."'5 2 The court also neglects to dis-
cuss the precedent set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright,'53 wherein the Court
overturned Betts v. Brady,'54 rejecting the flexible case-by-case analysis in
favor of an absolute right to counsel in criminal proceedings.'55 The reason
behind the rejected "totality of the circumstances" test in Gideon is equally
applicable to parents in termination of parental rights proceedings: an un-
147. Id. at 48-49.
148. Id. at 49.
149. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 50 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344).
150. Id. at 51.
151. Jd. at 40.
152. Id. at 49; see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344. The Lassiter majority's reliance on Gagnon
to justify case-by-case inquiry is misplaced. Gagnon 's adoption of a case-by-case analysis for
probation revocation proceedings is based on the non-adversarial nature of the proceedings,
the rehabilitative focus of the probative system, and the attenuated liberty interest of a con-
victed probationer. See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786-89. These rationales do not apply to a par-
ent seeking to preserve their undiminished parental rights in a fully adversarial parental sever-
ance proceeding. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 50 n.18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Jeffery M.
Mandell, Note, The Emerging Right of Legal Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings,
9 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 554, 558 n.29 (1976).
153. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
154. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
155. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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skilled, indigent defendant confronted with the formidable legal wherewithal
of the state in an adversarial proceeding unable to produce an adequate de-
fense, especially, under indigent circumstances.'56 A case-by-case analysis
also requires that the court prior to a hearing, examine the state's evidence to
determine what, if any, difference legal representation would make.'57 These
are complex questions of fairness that cannot be adequately answered until
after trial, if ever.
B. Similar Problems with S.B.
S.B. is fraught with similar inconsistencies and misleading notions. In
S.B. the court draws a distinction between a constitutional right to counsel
and a statutory right to counsel. 58 In Florida, a constitutional right to coun-
sel is warranted if a parent is at risk of criminal child abuse charges or in a
situation in which a proceeding will permanently terminate a parent's rights
in his/her child. 5 9 All other situations are put to the test, adopted in Potvin,
which looks at the length of the parent-child separation, the degree of paren-
tal restrictions on visitation, the presence or absence of parental consent, the
presence of disputed facts, and the complexity of the proceeding. 6 0
The case-by-case approach advanced by the Court imperils the interests
at stake in the case and the general administration of justice. 6' The Court's
holding essentially implies that unless a parent has a constitutional right to
counsel, he or she is not entitled to effective counsel.'62 Here again, the court
makes a distinction between litigants within the given context and does not
look at the decision-making context as a whole.'63 At the inception of a de-
pendency proceeding, the trial judge cannot be assured that, upon the conclu-
sion of the case, the circumstances will not be such that a parent will not
have permanently lost his or her rights in the child. Whenever a dependency
petition includes a ground for termination according to statute there is ulti-
mately the potential for the permanent termination of parental rights."6 Fur-
thermore, trial court judges cannot foretell whether criminal charges will
result from the facts and evidence brought forth at trial.
156. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
157. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 50-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
158. S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, No. SC02-2262, 2003 WL 21543565, at *1
(Fla. July 10, 2003).
159. Id. at *3.
160. ld; see Potvin v. Keller, 313 So. 2d 703, 706 (Fla. 1975).
161. Lassiter, 425 U.S. at 50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162. S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *1.
163. Compare S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at * 1, with Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 49.
164. Wofford v. Eid, 671 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
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Therefore, to determine at the beginning of the case whether a parent
has a statutory right to counsel in Florida or a constitutional right is implau-
sible. "'65 Moreover, the case-by-case approach adopted in Potvin, and prom-
ulgated by the Supreme Court's decision in S.B., is impracticable because it
requires that a trial judge determine the complexity of a proceeding that has
yet to occur. If the court recognizes that the circumstances in each case are
different for each litigant it should also recognize that the circumstances,
implications, and the nature of the proceedings involved in a termination of
parental rights suit will also be varied and cannot be predetermined. More-
over, the process advanced by the Supreme Court of Florida produces incon-
sistent results and "invites both confusion and appeal."'"
The court states that S.B. had a statutory right to appointed counsel be-
cause there was "nothing to suggest [that] the Department was planning to
pursue termination of parental rights."' 6 7 However, the end result was that
S.B.'s stature as parent was terminated. Thus, the court leads one to believe
that if the petitioner does not express, at the commencement of the proceed-
ing, that its ultimate goal is to terminate a parent's rights, a parent is not con-
stitutionally entitled to counsel. Even though the consequence might be that
a parent's rights in his or her child are completely and irrevocably lost.'68
Florida's Legislature recognized that providing counsel would be effec-
tive and economic, as well as necessary to the protection of a parent's rights
in his or her child 169 The legislature also recognized that reliance on a case-
by-case approach was both cumbersome and costly. 7° Therefore it recently
passed legislation requiring that indigent parents in dependency proceedings
be appointed counsel by the state. 7' Prior to the passing of this legislation
the appellate courts in Florida were confronted with numerous post verdict
challenges to the fairness of particular proceedings, and expended much en-
ergy in effect, evaluating the performance of trial court judges. 7 2 Yet, the
165. Cf Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S 18, 50 (1981). This can be likened to
Justice Blackmun's statement in his dissenting opinion wherein he criticizes the Court for
expecting a review of the record to determine whether a defendant proceeding without counsel
has suffered an unfair disadvantage. Id.
166. Dale 11, supra note 126, at 145.
167. S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, No. SC02-2262, 2003 WL 21543565, at *4
(Fla. July 10, 2003).
168. Id.
169. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.408(2), 39.465(1)(a)(4) (1997).
170. Id.
171. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (2002).
172. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law Issues in Florida in 1998, 23 NOVA L. REV. 819, 828-
89 (1999) (finding that the legislature provides parents with counsel as a practical matter
which should also help ease the appellate docket which had been rife with appeals because
20031
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Supreme Court of Florida has rendered the statutory right to counsel ineffec-
tive, because a statutory right to counsel does not warrant that a parents' lib-
erty interests be adequately represented by competent or effective assistance
of counsel.
17 3
VII. THE NATURE OF A TERMINATION OF PARENTAL PROCEEDING
The Supreme Court in S.B. undermines the authority of a statutory right
to counsel in Florida by denying an indigent parent competent counsel, be-
cause the parent's entitlement does not stem from a constitutional right.
Competent counsel is reserved for persons who warrant a constitutional
right. 74 This is based on the court's perspective that termination of parental
rights proceedings is civil in nature. 75  Because a termination proceeding is
civil in nature, a state is not constitutionally required to appoint counsel. 76
The United States Supreme Court has established, and the Supreme Court of
Florida has adopted, a presumption that counsel need not be provided in civil
cases in which a loss of physical liberty is not at stake.177 The constitutional
appointment of counsel is justified only when the indigent parent can satisfy
the Mathews or Potvin analysis to rebut the presumption that counsel is not
ordinarily provided. 7 s
Yet, to obtain a constitutional right to counsel is an insurmountable feat.
As the court illustrated in Lassiter, a fundamental interest in keeping one's
child, coupled with the extraordinarily high risk of error in a hearing con-
ducted without counsel, does not necessarily outweigh the government's
pecuniary interest in not providing counsel for indigent parents in parental
severance suits. 79  Moreover, Florida provides all indigent parents with
counsel in dependency proceedings, either through a constitutional or statu-
tory entitlement, but will not guarantee that a parent will not lose his or her
child as a result of the incompetence of appointed counsel, if the parent is not
a criminal, or if the state had not initially setout to take the children. 8 ' Yet,
under the old law, lack of counsel at the dependency stage rendered a termination adjudication
invalid).
173. S.B.,2003WL21543565at*l.
174. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 452 U.S 18, 18 (1981).
175. S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *4.
176. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 18; S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *1.
177. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at
*4.
178. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31; S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *3.
179. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31.
180. S.B., 2003 WL 21543565, at *4.
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the loss of liberty, or the perceived loss of liberty, mandates an absolute right
to the appointment of competent counsel for those who could not otherwise
afford it.'
The analyses of appointment of counsel in Lassiter and Gideon are ir-
reconcilable. Gideon fundamentally implies that the appointment of counsel
is essential to a fair trial. 82 Though the holding in that case addresses the
right to counsel for indigent criminal litigants, it has little to do with the dif-
ference between a loss of liberty and the loss of any other fundamental lib-
erty interest.'83 The Court in Gideon focuses not on the final result of litiga-
tion, but instead the process of litigation involved.'84 Gideon analogizes the
fundamental right to freedom accorded by the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment with other
provisions in the.Bill of Rights such as the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause.' "85 This undermines the dubious precedent upon which Lassiter lies,
namely that the inherent nature of the loss of liberty is the premise behind
Gideon. 1
86
Instead, the premise behind Gideon is the notion that a fair trial is not
possible without competent counsel on both sides.'87 Because, "reason and
reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system,. . . any per-
son haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."' 88 The Court in Lassiter fails to
delineate a reason why a parent in a termination of parental rights suit is
guaranteed a fair trial without counsel, but an indigent criminal defendant
does not have the same guarantee.
The majority of the decision in Gideon espouses the right to counsel for
litigants in all cases.'89 Justice Black buttresses this position by referencing
Justice Powell's decision in Powell v. Alabama,9° in which he states:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the in-
telligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law. If charged with a crime, he is incapable, gener-
181. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
182. Id. at 340.
183. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
184. Id.; Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 18.
185. Id. at 341-42.
186. Lassiter, 452 U.S at 18.
187. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335.
188. Id. at 344.
189. Id. at 335.
190. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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ally of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or
bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the
aid of counsel he may be put upon trial without proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge to adequately prepare his defense, even though he had
a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know
how to establish his innocence. 19 1
The concerns of the Court in Gideon and Powell seem to be: the inabil-
ity of a defendant to determine if charges against them are legitimate; the
inability or difficulty in understanding the law; the lack of knowledge of
rules of evidence and procedure; and the inability to put forth a good quality
defense. 9 2 If this is so, then why does the United States Supreme Court pre-
clude indigent parents in termination suits from their constitutional entitle-
ment of appointed counsel according to these same concerns? Does a case,
in which the state is prosecuting a parent, where the parent stands to lose his
or her child, not involve the same complexities or the potential of confront-
ing the same difficulties?
Besides, it has been said that a criminal trial may be easier to try then a
civil trial.'93 There are certain aspects of a criminal trial that are slanted in
favor of criminal defendants but are not in favor of litigants in termination of
parental rights proceedings.' 94 The accused criminal is presumed to be inno-
cent until the state stockpiles evidence in an effort to overcome that inno-
cence beyond a reasonable doubt.'95 Yet, a parent in a termination of paren-
tal rights proceeding holds an eviscerated presumption of innocence because
the state attorney, with an adept knowledge of the law, is required to estab-
lish a lesser burden of proof'96 against an indigent litigant with virtually no
191. Id.at68-69.
192. Id.
193. Earl Johnson, Jr. & Elizabeth Schwartz, Beyond Payne: The Case for a Legally
Enforceable Right to Representation in Civil Cases .for Indigent California Litigants, Part
One: The Legal Arguments, I I LoY. L.A. L. REV. 249, 265 (1978).
194. Id. In S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, No. SC02-2262, 2003 WL 21543565, at
*4 (Fla. July 10, 2003), the court states that though the procedures and goals of a parental
severance proceeding are different then a criminal proceeding, the issues addressed in criminal
post conviction hearings are part and parcel of dependency proceeding. However they fail to
clarify which procedure these are. Id.
195. Johnson & Schwartz, supra note 193, at 265.
196. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
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legal propensity.'97 Furthermore, personnel of the court have a responsibility
to screen the stages of criminal proceedings in order to make sure the inno-
cent go free and the guilty are prosecuted.' The prosecutor in a criminal
case also has an affirmative duty to reveal any favorable information pertain-
ing to the accused.'9 9 These same safeguards are not available to litigants in
civil proceedings.
The Court in Lassiter neglects to take notice of the court's rational in
Gideon."°° If the Court had examined the logic behind Gideon, it could not
assert the presumption that the right to counsel is only necessary when a per-
son's physical liberty interest is at stake. Gideon clearly stands for the
proposition that under the constitution, there is no difference in the quality of
the process based merely on the difference in the sanctions involved."0'
Moreover, the cases relied on in Lassiter do not support the presumption that
"physical confinement is the only loss of liberty grievous enough to trigger a
right to appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause."2 2 The Lassiter
court blindly applies this presumption, never considering the origin of the
presumption or why criminal defendants warrant more due process protec-
tion then indigent parents.
VIII. MAKING THE CASE FOR COMPETENT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Indigent parents have a right to counsel under Florida's Constitution;
therefore a right to competent counsel should naturally follow. Both the
United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Florida have de-
clared the right to effective assistance of counsel to be a basic extension of
the right to counsel. 20 3 "While the right to counsel may flow from, and have
its origins in, the Sixth Amendment in the criminal context and concepts of
due process under the United States and Florida Constitutions in the depend-
ency arena, the goal to be achieved is the participation of counsel acting as
competent counsel." 2°4
197. Johnson & Schwartz, supra note 193, at 265.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963); Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
452 U.S 18, 18 (1981).
201. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335.
202. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S.
778, 785-89 (1973); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492-94 (1980).
203. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); N.S.H. v. Dep't of Children & Family
Servs., 843 So. 2d 898, 904 (2003).
204. N.S.H.. 843 So. 2d at 904.
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The state has no interest in providing incompetent advocates or denying
parents relief. At first blush, money appears paramount; but society's para-
mount interest should be in the just determination of a person's rights and
privileges. Protecting an indigent parent's right to counsel and competent
assistance of counsel is crucial to preserving faith in America's justice sys-
tem. In a system in which a large percentage of Americans feel as though
the legal system is biased against the poor and minorities, and the majority
feel that the affluent and corporations have the upper hand, faith in the sys-
tem is rapidly eroding.0 5 In the courts, trust is essential because there "soci-
ety and institution come together in ways that really define who we would
like to think we are as a society-fair, open, and protective of the rights of
every individual."2 6
Furthermore, the money required to finance post-trial hearings for inef-
fective assistance of counsel is slight when compared with the costs of long-
term foster care. There are over 500,000 children in foster care in the United
States and approximately 34,292 in Florida.207  Therefore, states have an
economic interest in making certain that children are not needlessly sepa-
rated from their families, since years of foster care will likely be more costly
then appellate review of issues regarding incompetent counsel.
Aside from the economic advantage of leaving children in the custody
of their parents, when possible, Florida's disposition favors protecting chil-
dren and their relationship with their natural parents.20 8 If a parents' incom-
petent counsel has an affect on the court's adjudication, the state has a com-
pelling interest in reviewing the case so as not to remove a child needlessly
from his or her family. Thus far, the state has yet to be required to prove that
there is a safer and healthier environment available for children alleged to be
abused and neglected. Especially recently, in light of the crisis the Depart-
ment of Children and Family Services has faced.20 9 Permanently severing
parental rights is no guarantee that the child will be placed in more loving or
205. See National Conference on Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice System, Na-
tional Action Plan: A Guide for State and National Organizations, available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResAmtPTCNatlActionPlanPub.pdf (last vis-
ited July 26, 2003).
206. Id. at 9 (quoting Frank A. Bennack, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Hearst Corporation).
207. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Safety, Permanency, Well-being: Child Wel-
fare Outcomes 1999: Annual Report (2002), at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/
publications/cwo99/index.html.
208. In re E.H., 609 So. 2d 1289, 1290 (Fla. 1992) (citing Burk v. Dep't of Health & Re-
hab. Servs., 476 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 1985)).
209. See Timothy Arcaro, Florida's Foster Care System Fails Its Children, 25 NOVA L.
REV. 641 (2001).
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safe surroundings. Therefore, it makes social and economic sense to provide
parents with review of their claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Furthermore, there is a due process question in permitting the state to
appoint counsel without providing a judicial remedy for the counsel's inef-
fective assistance. If parents are not permitted to appeal adjudication based
on the incompetence of court-appointed counsel, they will not be afforded a
remedy that befits their loss. An indigent parent in a termination of parental
rights suit stands to lose rights in his or her child as a result of an attorney's
incompetence. Because a termination of parental rights suit is defined as
civil in nature, the usual remedy for one dissatisfied by counsel's perform-
ance is to bring a malpractice suit against the attorney.2"' A civil malpractice
suit will not accomplish the goal of regaining custody; the only relief a par-
ent may seek is monetary damages.2'
IX. CONCLUSION
The extent to which one is deprived is of critical importance in the due
process computation, the process to which an individual is entitled is in part
determined "by the extent to which he may be 'condemned to suffer grievous
loss. ' ' '212 Is there a loss more grievous then the removal of a child from its
parents? According to the Supreme Court of Florida and the United States
Supreme Court, the answer is yes. Based on their Constitutional interpreta-
tions, a parent losing his or her child is not a significant enough deprivation
to warrant the standard of due process protection.
Neither the language of the Constitution of the United States, Florida's
State Constitution, nor the society they fashion require that the Constitution
be interpreted to deny the poor an entitlement to governmental assistance in
exercising their basic rights. A parent, whether indigent or affluent, has a
fundamental right to conceive and raise his or her child.2 13 The United States
Supreme Court has recognized this right in upholding "[t]he fundamental
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of
their child."2 4 There is a compelling public interest in encouraging the
maintenance and protection of the intact family. Constitutional interpreta-
tions should not conclude with the provision of protections for family integ-
rity, but must further compel the government to provide the necessary fortifi-
210. In re Ak. V., 747 A.2d 570 (D.C. 2000).
211. See In re Azia B., 626 N.W.2d 602, 612 (Neb. Ct. App. 2001).
212. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S 18, 40 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
213. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
214. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982).
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cations to parents in preserving their constitutionally protected liberty inter-
est.
While state courts have acknowledged the precedents of the United
States Supreme Court, most courts have chosen to operate independently by
"interpreting rights more broadly then the United States Supreme Court. 215
For example, contrary to the Court's holding in Lassiter, most state courts
and legislatures have determined that an indigent parent's right to assistance
of counsel in a termination of parental right suit is part and parcel of the fun-
damental right to family integrity protected by the Constitution.21 6 In fur-
therance of the states' advanced perception of due process standards and
fundamental fairness, logic and common sense should compel states to con-
clude that, "if a parent's constitutional right to court-appointed counsel in
appropriate dependency proceedings is to consist of something more than a
meaningless formality, that right must include the right to effective assis-
tance by the attorney who is appointed.
217
215. Young, supra note 9, at 249.
216. See id.
217. L.W. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 812 So. 2d 551, 555 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2002).
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